Recently, Frazier et al. proposed a natural model for crowdsourced exploration of different a priori unknown options: a principal is interested in the long-term welfare of a population of agents who arrive one by one in a multi-armed bandit setting. However, each agent is myopic, so in order to incentivize him to explore options with better long-term prospects, the principal must offer the agent money. Frazier et al. showed that a simple class of policies called time-expanded are optimal in the worst case, and characterized their budget-reward tradeoff.
Introduction
The goal of mechanism design is to align incentives when different parties have conflicting interests. In the VCG mechanism, the mechanism designer wants to maximize social welfare whereas each bidder selfishly maximizes his own payoff. In revenue maximization, the objectives are even more directly opposed, as any increase in the bidders' surplus hurts the revenue for the auctioneer. In all of these cases, it is the mechanism's task to trade off between the differing interests.
The phrase "trade off" is also frequently applied in the context of online learning and the multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, where the "exploration vs. exploitation tradeoff" is routinely referenced. However, in the traditional view of a single principal making a sequence of decisions to maximize long-term rewards, it is not clear what exactly is being traded off against what. Recent work by Frazier et al. [9] makes this tradeoff more explicit, by juxtaposing a principal (with a farsighted goal of maximizing long-term rewards) with selfish and myopic agents. Thus, the principal wants to "explore," while the agents want to "exploit." In order to partially align the incentives, the principal can offer the agents monetary payments for pulling particular arms.
The framework of Frazier et al. [9] is motivated by many real-world applications, all sharing the property that the principal is interested in the long-term outcome of an exploration of different options, but cannot carry out the exploration herself 1 . Perhaps the most obvious fit is that of an online retailer with a large selection of similar products (e.g., cameras on amazon.com); in order to learn which of these products are best (and ensure that future buyers purchase the best product), the retailer needs to rely on customers to buy and review the products. Each customer prefers to purchase the best product for himself based on the current reviews, whereas the principal may want to obtain additional reviews for products that currently have few reviews, but may have the potential of being high quality. Customers can be incentivized to purchase such products by offering suitable discounts.
Other applications include crowd-sourced science projects, such as the search for celestial objects or bird or fish counts: individuals may prefer visiting areas with reliable sightings, while the principal would like underexplored areas to receive more coverage. In fact, even research funding can be naturally viewed in this context: while individual research groups may prefer to carry out research with good short-term rewards, funding agencies can use grants as an incentive to explore directions with long-term benefits.
Frazier et al. [9] explore this tradeoff under the standard time-discounted Bayesian 2 multi-armed bandit model (described formally in Section 2). In each round, each arm i has a known posterior reward distribution v i conditioned on its history so far, and one arm is pulled based on the current state of the arms. The principal's goal is to maximize the total expected time-discounted reward R = ∞ t=0 γ t E [v it ], where γ is the time discount factor. However, without incentives, each selfish agent would pull the myopic arm i maximizing the immediate expected reward E [v i ]. When the principal offers payments c i for pulling arms i, in [9] , the agent's utility for pulling arm i is E [v i ]+c i , and a myopic agent will choose the arm maximizing this sum. Implicit in this model is the assumption that all agents have the same (one-to-one) tradeoff between arm rewards and payments. In reality, different agents might have different and non-linear tradeoffs between these two, due to a number of causes. The most obvious is that an agent with a large money endowment (personal wealth or research funding) may not value additional payments as highly as an agent with smaller endowment; this is generally the motivation for positing concave utility functions of money. In the case of an online retailer, another obvious reason is that different customers may intend to use the product for different amounts of time or with different intensity, making the optimization of quality more or less important. Concretely, a professional photographer may be much less willing to compromise on quality in return for a discount than an amateur.
The main contribution of the present article is an extension of the model and analysis of Frazier et al. [9] to incorporate non-uniform and non-linear tradeoffs between rewards and money. We assume that each myopic agent has a monotone and concave money utility function µ : R + → R + mapping the agent's payment to the corresponding utility. The utility of an agent with money utility function µ is quasi-linear: E [v i ] + µ(c i ). The larger the values of µ, the easier it is to incentivize the agent with money, while an agent with µ ≡ 0 cannot be incentivized at all. When an agent arrives in round t, we assume that his money utility function µ t is drawn i.i.d. from some known distribution F .
An important question is then how much the principal knows about µ t at the time she chooses the payment vector c t = (c t,i ) i to announce for the arm pulls. In the worst case, the principal may know nothing about agent t as he arrives. In that case, the payment vector c t can only depend on F . At the other extreme, the principal may learn the value of µ t exactly. Then she is able to precisely control the myopic agent's decision by setting c accordingly 3 .
Reality will typically lie between these two extreme cases. Both financial endowments and intended use can be partially inferred from past searches and purchases in the case of an online retailer. This partial information will give the principal a more accurate estimate of the agent's money utility function value than what could be learned from the prior distribution F alone, allowing her to better engineer the incentives.
We formally model the notion of partial information using the standard economic notion of an exogenous signaling scheme [30] . A signaling scheme specifies how signals are correlated with the ground truth, via a conditional distribution.
For each possible ground truth value (here: µ t ), the signaling scheme prescribes a distribution over possible signals s ∈ Σ that could be revealed. Then, a known signaling scheme induces a posterior distribution when receiving a signal: when signal s is revealed to the principal, she can update her posterior belief of the money utility function µ from F to a more "accurate" F (µ|s).
The principal now has two goals, which stand in contrast with each other: minimizing her total expected time-discounted payment C = ∞ t=0 γ t c t,it , and maximizing her total expected timediscounted reward R. These two quantities in some sense capture the two objectives that must be traded off: R is the long-term reward to be maximized, while C captures the loss in immediate payoffs. There are two natural ways of combining these two objectives: The first is to maximize a Lagrangian objective R − λC, for some constant λ ∈ (0, 1). The other is to maximize R subject to a constraint on the total expected time-discounted payments.
Our Results
In Section 7, we show that in a certain sense, linear functions µ constitute the worst case for the principal. Specifically, we show that for every distribution over functions µ and a corresponding signaling scheme, we can determine a distribution over linear functions such that the proposed mechanisms in this article perform at least as well under the original distribution as under the modified one. On the other hand, we show that for certain MAB instances, the original distribution does not allow strictly better mechanisms than the distribution over linear functions. The proof relies heavily on the techniques developed throughout the article; however, it retroactively justifies the sole focus in the rest of the article on the case that µ t (x) = r t · x.
Let OPT γ be the optimal total expected time-discounted reward if the principal is allowed to pull arms herself. We call a policy an α-approximation policy if it achieves at least an α-fraction of OPT γ for every MAB instance. (Precise definitions are given in Section 2.) The main result of this paper is to characterize the optimal way to utilize partial information of agents to incentivize exploration from them.
Theorem 1 Let γ be the time discount factor. Given a prior distribution F (satisfying some technical conditions) and signaling scheme ϕ, one can efficiently compute a policy TES and p * (ϕ) such that the Lagrangian reward of TES is a (1 − p * (ϕ)γ)-approximation to OPT γ . This bound is tight.
Theorem 2 Given a prior distribution F (again, satisfying some technical conditions), signaling scheme ϕ and budget constraint b, there exists a policy TES whose total expected time-discounted reward is a min λ {1 − p * (ϕ)λ + λb} − ǫ approximation to OPT γ , while spending at most bOPT γ in expectation. This bound is tight.
In a sense, these theorems quantify the power of partial information ϕ about a money utility function distribution F in a single number 1 − p * (ϕ)γ, via the approximation guarantee that can be achieved using this signal. If this number is meaningful, more informative signaling schemes should allow for better approximation ratios. Specifically, a garbling [26] of a signaling scheme ϕ is another signaling scheme ϕ ′ whose output is computed solely from the output of ϕ, without knowledge of the true underlying state of the world. (A formal definition is given in Section 8.) In this sense, ϕ ′ cannot contain more information than ϕ. Then, we prove the following theorem in Section 8.
Theorem 3 Let ϕ and ϕ ′ be two signaling schemes such that ϕ ′ is a garbling of ϕ.
In Section 3, we prove the lower bound (algorithm) part of Theorem 1 by using the idea of time-expansion of policies from [9] . The main idea there is to randomize between pulls of the myopically optimal arm and the arm pulled by an optimal policy. Contrary to [9] , we now have to carefully coordinate the randomization and payment policies for the different possible signals. This is accomplished by a convex program: the program is formulated predominantly as a heuristic, designed to cancel out myopic reward terms in the objective, which are otherwise difficult to analyze.
In Section 4, we prove that this heuristic is surprisingly optimal. For the matching upper bound, we use a class of instances called Diamonds-in-the-Rough [9] , and show that the optimal policy using payments can only achieve a Lagrangian reward of (1 − p * (φ)γ)OPT γ . We characterize the optimal policy with a different convex program. Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality of solutions to a convex program [24] , we relate these two convex programs and show that their solution is actually the same, thus proving worst-case optimality.
We remark on the computational considerations of the proposed policies. Given an explicit representation of the distribution F and the signaling scheme, the convex program produceswithout knowledge of any MAB instance -a vector of target randomization probabilities q between myopic and non-myopic play, as well as the optimal p * . When an actual MAB instance is specified, the algorithm draws on the optimum policy OPT η for a different time-discount factor η. When an agent arrives, the principal needs to identify the myopically optimal arm and the arm pulled by OPT η under a subset of the revealed information. Then, using the desired randomization, she can easily compute the required payments.
Thus, the only computationally challenging part is to compute the arm pulled by the optimum policy OPT η . This can be accomplished by the well-known Gittins Index policy [11] , which computes an index for each arm i based on the posterior distribution of rewards (or state of the Markov chain), and then chooses the arm with largest index. Thus, the policy avoids a combinatorial explosion in the number of arms, but computing the index of an arm can be non-trivial.
For the budgeted version, one first needs to find a suitable Lagrangian multiplier λ ensuring that the expected payment respects the budget, and then find the optimum policy for that λ. Finding λ requires analyzing the specific MAB instance and thus the optimal probabilities q are not independent of the MAB instance any more. Theorem 2 is proved in Section 6.
Throughout this article and [9] , it was assumed that the principal can observe the action that the agent took, and base the payment upon it. In many settings, the principal may only observe the arm reward that the agent obtained, but not the actual arm pulled. For instance, when the agent is a scientist, a funding agency may be unable to tell whether a scientific result was achieved by deliberately following an ambitious agenda, or by stumbling upon it. In terms of the model, an inability to observe the action means that the payment scheme can be based only on the agent's observed reward. In Appendix B, we show that in this kind of scenario, it is impossible to incentivize the agent to pull optimal arms.
Related Work
The MAB problem was first proposed by Robbins [27] as a model for sequential experiments design. Under the Bayesian model with time-discounted rewards, the problem is solved optimally by the Gittins Index policy [11] ; a further discussion is given in [32, 19, 10, 12] .
An alternative objective, often pursued in the CS literature, is regret-minimization, as initiated by Lai and Robbins [22] within a Bayesian arm reward setting. Auer et al. [2, 3] gave an algorithm with regret bound for adversarial settings.
There is a rich literature that considers MAB problems when incentive issues arise. A common model is that a principal has to hire workers to pull arms, and both sides want to maximize their own utility. Singla and Krause [28] gave a truthful posted price mechanism. In [21, 25] , the reward history is only known by the principal, and she can incentivize workers by disclosing limited information about the reward history to the worker. Ho et al. [18] used the MAB framework as a tool to design optimal contracts for agents with moral hazard. Using the technique of discretization, they achieved sublinear regret for the net utility (reward minus payment) over the time horizon. For a review of more work in the area, see the position paper [29] .
Bergemann and Välimäki [6] and Bolton and Harris [7] consider incentive issues from another viewpoint. In their model, there are only two arms corresponding to two sellers and one or multiple buyers. Both sellers can set a price for a single pull of their own arm. After each pull, sellers can adjust their prices, and buyers can change their choices, which will eventually lead to an (efficient) equilibrium.
MAB problems with additional constraints and structure are also studied in various settings. Guha and Munagala [14, 16, 15 ] study a series of models with different constraints. In [20] , for arms defined within a metric space and satisfying a Lipschitz condition, the authors found an optimal algorithm that matches the best possible regret ratio. Goel et al. [13] introduced an index policy, similar to the Gittins index policy, with constant approximation for the time horizon constrained MAB problem. Badanidiyuru et al. [4] investigated MAB problems with general multi-dimensional constraints.
The role of information in markets was introduced formally by Stigler [31] . Subsequently, Akerlof [1] , Spence [30] began the study of effects of additional information, or signals, on the market. For exogenous signaling schemes, Hirshleifer [17] , Bassan et al. [5] , Lehrer et al. [23] explored the positive and negative effects on the equilibrium of different game settings.
Preliminaries

Multi-armed Bandits
In a Bayesian multi-armed bandits (MAB) instance, we are given N arms, each of which evolves independently as a known Markov chain whenever pulled. In each round 4 t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , an algorithm can only pull one of the arms; the pulled arm will generate a random reward and then transition to a new state randomly according to the known Markov chain.
Formally, let v t,i be the random reward generated by arm i if it is pulled at time t. Let S 0,i be the initial state of the Markov chain of the i-th arm and S t,i the state of arm i in round t. The distribution of v t,i is determined by S t,i . Then, an MAB instance consists of N independent Markov chains and their initial states S 0 = (S 0,i ) N i=1 . In this article, we are only interested in cases where the reward sequence for any single arm forms a Martingale, i.e.,
A policy A is an algorithm that decides which arm to pull in round t based on the history of observations and the current state of all arms. Formally, a policy is a (randomized) mapping
is the vector of arms' states, H t is the history up to time t, and i t is the selected arm.
To evaluate the performance of a policy A, we use standard time-discounting [11] . Let γ ∈ (0, 1) be the time discount factor that measures the relative importance between future rewards and present rewards. If a policy A receives an immediate reward of v t,it in round t, it is discounted by a factor of γ t and then added to the total reward. The total expected time-discounted reward can thus be defined as:
where E A [ · ] denotes the expectation conditioned on the policy A being followed and the information it obtained, as in [9] . Given a time discount factor γ, we denote the optimal policy for that time discount (and also -in a slight overload of notation -its total expected time-discounted reward) by OPT γ .
We call the arm with the maximum immediate expected reward E [v t,i | S t ] the myopic arm. A policy is called myopic if it pulls the myopic arm in each round. The myopic policy only exploits with no exploration, so it is inferior to the optimum policy in general, especially when the time-discount factor γ is close to 1.
Selfish Agents
We label each agent by the time t when he arrives. The Markov chain state S t and E [v t,i | S t ] are publicly known by both the agents and the principal.
In round t, the principal can offer a payment c t,i for pulling arm i. Incentivized by these extra payments c t,i , agent t with money utility function µ t now pulls the arm maximizing E [v t,i | S t,i ] + µ t (c t,i ). If the agent pulls arm i t at time t, then the principal's reward from this pull is E [v t,it | S t,it ], and the agent's utility is E [v t,it | S t,it ] + µ t (c t,it ). ( [9] studied the special case where µ t (x) = x for all x ≥ 0 and t.)
We assume a publicly known prior (whose distribution is denoted by F 5 ) over the money utility functions µ. When a new agent arrives, his money utility function is drawn from F independently of prior draws.
As discussed in the introduction, we show in Section 7 that the worst-case analysis can without loss of generality focus on the case in which all money utility function are linear, i.e., of the form µ t (x) = r t · x for some r t . Therefore, apart from that section itself, we will exclusively focus on the case of linear money utility functions. We then identify the distribution F with a distribution over the values r t , which we call the conversion ratio of agent t. For the remainder of this article, all distributions and signals are assumed to be over conversion ratios instead of money utility functions.
Lemma 4 For every distribution F over money utility functions, there exists another distribution F ′ over linear money utility functions (i.e., over conversion ratios) such that the optimal approximation ratio is the same for F and F ′ .
The definition of optimal approximation ratio can be found in Definition 8.
Signaling Scheme
We assume the existence of an exogenous signaling scheme, i.e., the signaling scheme is given as input 6 . When an agent with conversion ratio r arrives, a signal s ∈ Σ correlated to r is revealed to the principal according to the signaling scheme ϕ; Σ is called the signal space, and we assume that it is countable. When the signal space is uncountable, defining the posterior probability density requires the use of Radon-Nikodym derivatives, and raises computational and representational issues. In Section 5, we consider what is perhaps the most interesting special case: that the signal reveals the precise value of r to the principal.
Formally, let ϕ(r, s) be the probability that signal s is revealed when the agent's conversion ratio is r. In this way, the signals are statistically correlated with the conversion ratio r, and thus each signal reveals partial information about the true value of r. After receiving the signal s, the principal updates her posterior belief of the agent's conversion ratio according to Bayes Law 7 :
where f s (r) is the PDF of the posterior belief and p s = ∞ 0 ϕ(r, s)f (r)dr is the probability that signal s is observed. For each signal s ∈ Σ, let F s be the CDF of the corresponding posterior belief. As a special case, if the signaling scheme reveals no information, then F s = F .
Throughout, we focus on the case when the posterior distributions F s satisfies a condition called semi-regularity (this is the technical condition mentioned in Theorems 1 and 2), which is defined as follows:
Semi-regularity is a generalization of a well-known condition called regularity, defined as follows.
Lemma 7, proved in Appendix A, establishes that regularity implies semi-regularity, and hence our result is more general.
is convex. In particular, regularity implies semi-regularity.
Policies with partial information
The previous definition we gave of a policy did not take information about the agent's type into account. In light of this additional information, we give a refined definition. In addition to deciding which arm to pull, a policy may decide the payment to offer the agents based on the partial information obtained from signals. Formally, a policy is now a randomized mapping A : (t, H t , S t , s t ) → c t , where s t is the signal revealed in round t, and c t,i is the extra payment offered for pulling arm i in round t. After c t is announced, a myopic agent with conversion ratio r will pull the arm i t that maximizes his own utility, causing that arm to transition according to the underlying Markov chain.
The expected payment of the principal is also time-discounted by the same 8 factor γ. When A is implemented, the total expected payment will be
The principal faces two conflicting objectives: (a) maximizing the total expected time-discounted reward R (γ) (A); (b) minimizing the total expected time-discounted payment C (γ) (A); There are two natural ways of combining the two objectives: via a Lagrangian multiplier, or by optimizing one subject to a constraint on the other.
In the Lagrangian objective, the principal wishes to maximize R (γ) (A) − λC (γ) (A) for some constant λ ∈ (0, 1). Here, λ can also be regarded as the conversion ratio for the principal herself. Alternatively, the principal may be constrained by a budget b, and want to maximize R (γ) (A) subject to the constraint that C (γ) (A) ≤ b.
Approximation Framework
Frazier et al. [9] performed a worst-case analysis over MAB instances and studied the (worst-case) approximation ratio. In this article, we similarly perform a worst-case analysis with respect to the MAB instances, while keeping an exogenous signaling scheme ϕ and the prior F fixed.
Definition 8
For the Lagrangian objective of the problem, a policy A has approximation ratio α under the signaling scheme ϕ and prior F if for all MAB instances 9 ,
We say that α is the optimal approximation ratio if there exists a policy with approximation ratio α and no policies have a better approximation ratio.
Likewise, for the budgeted version, a policy has approximation ratio α respecting budget b if
3 Lower bound: Time-Expanded Algorithm
In this section, we focus on the Lagrangian objective, and analyze time-expanded algorithms, in a generalization of the originally proposed notion of [9] . In a time-expanded algorithm, the principal randomizes between offering the agents no reward (having them play myopically), and offering the reward necessary to incentivize the agent to play the arm i * t according to a particular algorithm A. In the presence of signals, the randomization probabilities for the different signals need to be chosen and optimized carefully, which is the main algorithmic contribution in this section. On the other hand, notice that if the posterior distribution of the conversion ratio conditioned on the signal is continuous, then the randomness in the user's type can instead be used as a randomization device, and the principal may be able to offer incentives deterministically.
More formally, Frazier et al. [9] define a time-expanded version TE p,A of a policy A, parameterized by a probability p, as
where Z t is a Bernoulli(1 − p) variable.Ŝ t is the arm status that couples the execution of the time-expanded policy and the policy A, which we will formally define later. When Z t = 1, with the uniform agents defined in [9] , in order to incentivize an agent to pull the non-myopic arm, the principal has to offer a payment of
. A time-expanded version of policy A with signaling scheme ϕ works as follows: at time t, conditioned on the received signal s, the principal probabilistically offers a payment of c t,i * t if the agent t pulls the arm i * t . Notice that only two options might maximize the agent's utility: pulling the myopic arm, or pulling the arm i * t and getting the payment. There is a direct correspondence between the payment c t,i * t and the probability q s that the agent chooses to pull the myopic arm. We will describe this correspondence below.
First, though, we discuss which arm i * t the principal is trying to incentivize the agent to pull. As in [9] , it is necessary for the analysis that the execution of A and of its time-expanded version can be coupled. To achieve this, in order to evaluate which arm should be pulled next by A, the principal must only take the information obtained from the non-myopic pulls into consideration. Formally, we defineŜ t as follows:
Define the random variable Z t := 0 agent t pulls the myopic arm 1 otherwise and X t,i = 1 if arm i is pulled at time t and 0 otherwise. Notice that Z t is a Bernoulli variable, and Prob[Z t = 0] depends on the received signal s and the payment offered by the principal. Let N t,i = t−1 0 Z t X t,i be the number of non-myopic pulls of arm i before time t. Using this notation, we defineŜ t,i to be the state of the Markov chain of arm i after the first 10 N t,i pulls in the execution history of the time-expanded policy, andŜ t = (Ŝ t,i ) i . Let F s be the posterior CDF of the agent's conversion ratio. Let x = max i E [v t,i | S t ] be the expected reward of the myopic arm and y = E v t,i * t | S t be the expected reward of arm i * t . If the principal offers a payment of c t,i * t , then agents with conversion ratio r < x−y c t,i * t will still choose the myopic arm. Assuming that agents break ties in favor of the principal, when r ≥ x−y c t,i * t , they will prefer to pull arm i * t . Conversely, in order to achieve a probability of q s for pulling the myopic arm, the principal can choose a payment of c t,
, the probability of myopic play (conditioned on the signal) is exactly q s , and c t,i * t is the smallest payment achieving this probability. If there is a discontinuity at x−y c t,i * t , then for every ǫ > 0, the probability of myopic play with payment c t,i * t + ǫ is less than q s . In that case, the principal offers a payment of c t,i * t with probability 1−qs 1−Fs((x−y)/c t,i * t ) for pulling arm i * t , and no payment otherwise. Now, the probability of a myopic pull will again be exactly q s .
To express the payment more concisely, we write F s −1 (q s ) = sup{r|F s (r) ≤ q s }. Then, the payment can be expressed as c t,
. In particular, when F s is continuous, c t,i * t will be offered deterministically; otherwise, the principal randomizes.
In summary, we have shown a one-to-one mapping between desired probabilities q s for myopic play, and payments (and possibly probabilities, in the case of discontinuities) for achieving the q s . We write q = (q s ) s∈Σ for the vector of all probabilities. The unconditional (prior) probability of playing myopically is s∈Σ p s q s , and the expected payment (x − y) · s∈Σ p s
1−qs
. We can now summarize the argument above and give a formal definition of the time-expanded version of policy A with signaling scheme ϕ, Definition 9 A policy TES q,A,ϕ is a time-expanded version of policy A with signaling scheme ϕ, if at time t, after receiving the signal s about agent t's conversion ratio, the principal chooses (randomized) payments such that the myopic arm is pulled with probability q s , and the arm i * t = A(Ŝ t ) is pulled with probability 1 − q s . This can be achieved by offering the agent, with probability 1−qs 1−sup{Fs(r)|Fs(r)≤qs} , a payment of
for pulling arm i * t . Here, F s (r) is the CDF of the posterior distribution of the agent's conversion ratio conditioned on signal s.
The key technical lemma gives a sufficient condition on q that allows us to obtain a good approximation ratio of the Lagrangian to the optimum solely in terms of s p s q s .
Lemma 10
, there exists a policy A, such that the time-expanded policy TES q,A,ϕ satisfies
The proof of Lemma 10 rests heavily on variations of the following lemmas from [9] . They are extremely straightforward modifications of Lemmas 4.2 and 3.2 from [9] , and the proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 11 (Modification of Lemma 4.2 of [9])
. Then, for any 0 ≤ n ≤ t,
Lemma 12 (Modification of
Lemma 13 (Theorem 1.2 of [9] ) Consider a fixed MAB instance (without selfish agents) with two different time discount factors η < γ, and let OPT η , OPT γ be the optimum time-discounted reward achievable under these discounts. Then, OPT η ≥
(1−η) 2 · OPT γ , and this bound is tight.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let A be the optimal policy for the time-discount factor η =
(1−p)γ 1−pγ , where p = s∈Σ p s q s . We then have
completing the proof.
According to Lemma 10, the approximation guarantee of the time-expanded policy TES is monotone decreasing in p = s∈Σ p s q s . This suggests a natural heuristic for choosing the myopic probabilities q: minimize p subject to satisfying the conditions of the lemma. This optimization can be carried out using the following non-linear program. Surprisingly, this naïve heuristic, motivated predominantly by the need to cancel out terms in the proof of Lemma 10, actually gives us the optimal approximation ratio. We will prove this in Section 4.
First, notice that the optimization problem is feasible, because q = 1 is a trivial solution. Whenever F s is semi-regular,
is convex. Therefore, the feasibility region of the optimization problem (5) is convex, and the problem can be solved efficiently [8] .
Theorem 14 Given a signaling scheme ϕ, let q * be the optimal solution of the convex program (5), and p * the optimal value. Let η =
This proves the first half of Theorem 1 in the introduction. Notice in Theorem 14 that q can be determined without knowledge of the specific MAB instance; only the signaling scheme needs to be known.
Upper bound: Diamonds in the Rough
In this section, we show that the approximation ratio 1 − p * γ is actually tight when the distribution F s is semi-regular, where p * is the value of the convex program (5). For simplicity, when q * is clear from the context, we let TES * denote the policy TES q * ,OPTη where η =
(1−p * )γ 1−p * γ (as in Theorem 14). We will show that on a class of MAB instances called Diamonds-in-the-rough [9] , the optimal policy with payments (defined below) can achieve only a (1 − p * γ)-fraction of OPT γ . Therefore, not only is the analysis of TES * 's approximation ratio tight, but TES * also has the optimal approximation ratio 1 − p * γ.
Definition 15
The Diamonds-in-the-rough MAB instance ∆(B, γ) is defined as follows. Arm 1 has constant value 1 − γ. All other (essentially infinitely many) arms have the following reward distribution:
1. With probability 1/M , the arm's reward is a degenerate distribution of the constant (1−γ)B·M (good state);
2. With probability 1 − 1/M , the arm's reward is a degenerate distribution of the constant 0 (bad state).
Note that if B < 1, then arm 1 is the myopic arm. Since ∆(B, γ) is uniquely determined by B and is just one single instance, the optimal policy that maximizes the Lagrangian objective, i.e., R (γ) (A) − λC (γ) (A), is well-defined 11 . We call the policy that maximizes the Lagrangian objective the optimal policy with payments, and denote it by OP T (γ) λ (∆(B, γ)). We can solve for the optimal policy with payments using another convex program, which we next derive. Suppose that the optimal policy with payments has time-discounted Lagrangian objective V . In the first round, it only has two options: (a) let the agent play myopically (i.e., pull the constant arm); (b) incentivize him to play a non-constant arm.
If option (a) is chosen and the agent pulled the constant arm, then the principal learns nothing and faces the same situation in the second round. So conditioned on the constant arm being pulled, the principal will get 1 − γ + γV . If option (b) is chosen and a non-constant arm was pulled, then with probability 1/M , the non-constant arm will be revealed to be in the good state, and the principal does not need to pay any agent again, obtaining value (1 − γ)B · M ∞ i=0 γ i = B · M ; with probability 1 − 1/M , the non-constant arm will be revealed to be in the bad state, and the principal faces the same situation in the second round, obtaining value γV . Recall that c s is the payment needed to ensure that the myopic arm is played with probability at most q s when signal s is revealed. To summarize, if we set the probabilities for myopic play to (q s ) s∈Σ , then V satisfies the following equation:
Solving for V while taking M → ∞, we get (1 − γ)V = (1 − γ) s∈Σ p s q s + s∈Σ p s (1 − q s )(B − λc s ). As the difference between the expected rewards of the myopic arm and the non-myopic arm is (1 − γ) − (1 − γ)B, we have c s =
. The optimal policy with payments needs to choose the best myopic probabilities, which is equivalent to:
for all s ∈ Σ.
Notice that the objective function of program (7) is concave, so the program is convex. Letq be the optimal solution to the program (7). Denote by A(q) the policy determined byq. Recall that q * is the solution to the following convex program:
Note that theq are probabilities for choosing the myopic arm given by the above program and depend on a specific MAB instance, i.e., ∆(B, γ). On the other hand, q * is independent of any MAB instance and only depends on the signaling scheme ϕ and F . Lemma 18 shows that for the right choice of B,q and q * actually coincide on the corresponding Diamonds-in-the-rough instance.
The proof relies heavily on the KKT condition [24] , so we assume that
is continuously differentiable and use the KKT condition for differentiable functions. When derivatives do not exists, we can use the sub-differential versions of KKT. Since we would like the characterization to hold for countably infinite signal spaces (and thus infinitely many variables), we have to be somewhat careful about the specific notion of differentiability, but note that standard notions such as Gateaux Differentiability [24] can be used here.
Definition 16 (Slater condition)
For a convex program with no equality constraints, the Slater condition is met if there exists a point x such that g i (x) < 0 for all constraints i.
It to easy to check that the program (5) satisfies the Slater condition.
Theorem 17 (KKT condition for infinite dimension) Consider a program satisfying the Slater condition: minimize f (x) subject to g i (x) ≤ 0 for i = 1, . . . , m. If x * is the local minimum, then there exist multipliers µ i for i = 1, . . . , m such that:
Lemma 18 There exists a B such that the myopic probabilities given by the convex program (5) are equal to the myopic probabilities given by program (7).
Proof. First, we observe that the boundary case q s = 0 can be safely ignored in both convex programs (5) and (7). This is because
approaches infinity as q s → 0. For program (5) , this violates the non-trivial feasibility constraint; for program (7) , this is clearly sub-optimal.
Next, we prove that every local optimum q * is interior for convex program (5) . Applying the stationarity condition of the KKT Theorem to program (5), we know that for every s ∈ Σ, the optimal solution q * satisfies:
Here, µ s is the multiplier for the constraint 0 ≤ q s ≤ 1, and σ is the multiplier for the non-trivial constraint. It is important that σ is a constant that is independent of any MAB instance. Setting q * s = 1 for all s ∈ Σ is clearly not an optimal solution as there will be slack in the constraints and decreasing q * s can improve the objective for program (5) . Hence, there is an s ∈ Σ such that q * s < 1. By complementarity, µ s = 0, so that −p s = σ(λp s ∂ ∂x
λσ . But we know that F s is semi-regular, so
(Equality is impossible, as it would imply
∂ ∂x
by definition of semi-regularity. But then,
would not be strictly monotone, violating the fact that F s is non-decreasing.) Because σ−1 λσ < 0, we infer that σ ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand, if q * s = 1 for some s ∈ Σ, then µ s ≥ 0 and −p s = µ s −σ·p s (as
| x=1 = 0), so σ ≥ 1. This would be a contradiction to σ < 1, so we infer that q * s < 1 for every s ∈ Σ. For program (7), we first compute the partial derivative of the objective w.r.t. q s ; it is
Rearranging and using the fact that
, we can rewrite it as
Let B ∈ (1 − γ, 1) solve the equation Recall thatq is a global, and thus local, maximum of program (7). Assume thatq s = 1 for some s. Then,
| x=qs = 0, so the partial derivative of the objective (11) w.r.t. q s will be p s (1 − γ − B), which is negative because B > 1 − γ. Thus, decreasingq s would maintain feasibility and increase the value of the program (7). Hence, any local maximum of the program (7) must be an interior point as well.
In summary, both q * andq are interior. By the KKT condition for q * , all the µ i 's are zero, and thus
λσ . Becauseq is a local optimum, expression (11) must be equal to zero, so
(1−γ) (1−B) . By the choice of B, we then obtain that
is negative and non-decreasing. Thus, it must be constant on the entire interval [q s , q * s ]. This means that the derivative (11) of the objective of program (7) is constant over the entire interval, and we established above that it is 0 atq s . Thus, the objective function of program (7) is unchanged by replacingq s with q * s . By performing this operation for all s, we eventually obtain that without loss of generality,q = q * .
Based on this lemma, we now prove the main theorem in this section. This also proves the second half of Theorem 1 in the introduction.
Theorem 19
The policy TES * , parameterized by q * , has optimal approximation ratio 1 − p * γ. In particular, there exists a worst-case MAB instance in which the optimal policy with payments achieves exactly a Lagrangian reward of a (1 − p * γ) fraction of the optimum.
Proof. Lemma 18 showed that for every signaling scheme, there is a B (a parameter of the nonconstant arms) such that q * andq coincide on the MAB instance ∆(B, γ). It remains to show that these instances are in fact worst-case instances, i.e., that the ratio between R (γ) λ (A(q)) and OPT γ in ∆(B, γ) is exactly 1 − p * γ.
First note that OPT γ = B 1−γ : once a non-constant arm is revealed to be in a good state, it is optimal to pull that arm forever. We next show that R (γ)
. Thereto, we use both convex programs and the fact thatq = q * . Substituting q * into the objective of program (7), we obtain the following Lagrangian reward for the time-expanded policy:
) .
The non-trivial constraint of program (5) has to be tight; otherwise, the objective could be increased by lowering individual q * s values. Therefore, s∈Σ p s q * s = λ s∈Σ p s
, which allows us to simplify the previous expression to
Thus, on this instance, R
By Theorem 14, this bound is tight.
Full Information Revelation
Our main positive results hold for the case of countable or finite signal spaces, whereas uncountable signal spaces lead to technical challenges. However, one important special case of uncountable signal spaces is more easily handled, namely, when the principal learns the exact conversion ratio r, i.e., s = r. We show that in that case, r itself can be used as the sole randomization device, leading to a threshold policy. In this section, we assume that the distribution F is continuous (an assumption that was not needed in Section 3).
Optimal Time-Expanded Policy
Our first goal will be to show that the optimal time-expanded policy fixes a threshold θ and only incentivizes agents whose conversion ratio lies above the threshold. Then, an optimization over threshold policies is easy to carry out.
Definition 20
The threshold policy TP θ,A with threshold θ is defined as follows: When an agent with conversion ratio r arrives, he is incentivized with suitable payment to pull i * t = A(Ŝ t ) if and only if r ≥ θ.
Lemma 21
Consider a single arm pull, and a value q ∈ [0, 1]. Among all policies that have this arm pull be myopic with probability q, the one minimizing expected cost is a threshold policy.
Proof. Consider any policy P, and assume that q = Prob[P lets the agent play myopically]. Now, define θ = sup{r|F (r) = q}, so that F (θ) = q.
As before, we write x = max i E [v t,i | S t , Z 0:t−1 ] and y = E v t,i * t | S t , Z 0:t−1 . For any r, let P r = 1 iff P incentivizes agents with conversion ratio r. The expected payment of policy P is then
where the last step used the definition of θ, implying that the measure (under F ) of conversion ratio r < θ for which P incentivizes agents is the same as the measure of r > θ for which P does not incentivize agents. The final expression is the expected Lagrangian cost of P ′ , so we have shown that P ′ has no larger cost than P in this one round.
Lemma 22
The Lagrangian objective of any time-expanded policy P of A is (weakly) dominated by that of a threshold policy.
Proof. Consider a time-expanded policy P. Thus, the probability q with which P lets the agent play myopically is the same in each round. As in the proof of Lemma 21, we let θ = sup{r|F (r) = q}.
Because F (θ) = q, in each round, the reward of P is the same as that of the threshold policy with threshold θ.
Lemma 21 establishes that in each round, the cost of P ′ is no more than that of P; thus, the Lagrangian objective for P ′ is at least as large as for P.
Because of Lemma 22, it suffices to study the optimal threshold policy, and determine the correct threshold.
As before, we let x = max i E [v t,i | S t , Z 0:t−1 ], and y = E v t,i * t | S t , Z 0:t−1 . The expected Lagrangian reward of TP θ,A is
Because F was assumed continuous, so is
has a solution θ. Fixing this choice of θ, the expected Lagrangian payoff simplifies to y. The rest of the proof now proceeds as in the proof of Lemma 10, yielding an approximation ratio of 1 − F (θ)γ. Writing p * = F (θ) for the unconditional probability of a myopic pull under TP θ,A , we obtain the same (1 − p * γ) approximation ratio for the Lagrangian objective as for the case of discrete signals.
Upper Bound
As for discrete signals, we next give a Diamonds-in-the-rough instance ∆(B, γ) on which the upper bound for any policy matches the approximation ratio of the threshold policy. Consider the choice of the policy in the first round; it allows the agent to play myopically with some probability q. By Lemma 21, the optimal way to implement this probability q is to choose a threshold 12 θ and offer incentives to the agent if and only if r ≥ θ. Denote by θ * the threshold we get for the time-expanded policy, i.e., the solution of
r . Now, similar to Equation (6), the corresponding Lagrangian objective is
Letting M → ∞ and solving Equation (12), we obtain
Taking a derivative of Equation (13) with respect to θ suggests (note that the function may not be differentiable, so this is merely used as a tool to suggest a useful choice) that if we set B to solve −λ(1 − γ)(1 − B) = (1 − γ − B)θ * , then our previously chosen threshold θ * will be optimal for the instance ∆(B, γ).
We next verify that this is indeed the case. Substituting the value of B into Equation (13), we obtain that maximizing Equation (13) is equivalent to minimizing
r . Now, for any θ, we have
So θ * is the maximizer of Equation (13) for the specific choice of B. Thus, on this particular instance, the ratio achieved by our threshold policy matches that of best possible policy.
Budgeted version
In this section, we show matching lower and upper bounds for maximizing the total expected timediscounted reward with a budget constraint. Let b be the fraction of OP T γ that the principal is allowed to use (i.e., the principal's budget is b · OP T γ ). Recall that p * (λ) is the optimal value of the convex program (5).
Theorem 23
Given budget b · OP T γ , there exists a policy whose approximation ratio (with respect to OP T γ ) is min
Proof. First, one can prove that for every p ∈ [0, 1), there exists a λ such that p * (λ) = p. Then, as every unconditional myopic probability p can be achieved using some λ, we can follow the same approach in Frazier et al. [9] by taking the limit of a sequence of probabilities (p n ) n that approaches p. Here, the policy corresponding to each p n respects (or exhausts) the budget, while the policy for p exhausts (or respects) the budget. By suitable randomization between these policies, one can show that the approximation ratio (with respect to OPT γ ) approaches min λ {1 − p * (λ) + λb} in the limit.
Theorem 24
Given budget b · OP T γ , the factor min λ {1 − p * (λ)γ + λb} is tight.
Proof. Again consider the class of Diamonds-in-the-rough instances. Assume that the optimal policy that respects the budget is A. Thus C (γ) (A) ≤ b · OPT γ for every MAB instance. Moreover, by Lemma 18, we know that for every Lagrangian multiplier λ, the optimal policy for that λ and its corresponding ∆(B, γ) has Lagrangian objective value exactly ( 
This means that for every Lagrangian multiplier λ (and its corresponding Diamonds-in-therough instance ∆(B, γ)), we have the following equivalent inequalities for all λ ∈ (0, 1),
This matches the theorem above.
Reducing Concave Money Value to Linear Money Value
In this section, we show that among concave money utility functions, linear functions obtain the worst-case approximation ratio. This shows that our assumption that agents have linear money utility functions is without loss of generality in regard to worst-case approximation ratios. We fix the distribution (or prior) over agents and the signaling scheme and then perform a worst-case analysis over MAB instances. The intuition is that the rewards of an MAB instance can be scaled up so large that only the asymptotic behavior of concave money utility functions matters. For any money utility function µ, define r µ = lim x→∞ µ(x)
x to be the limiting slope 13 
s , the function µ is mapped to the function
s is a continuous distribution for each s. Our proof breaks into two parts: lower bound (algorithm) and upper bound (impossibility). Lower bound: Given the true distribution (F s ) s∈Σ over concave functions, instead compute the optimal policy for (D 1 s ) s∈Σ , which we denote by OPT 1 . Notice that OPT 1 is a time-expansion policy and only offers payment on the Gittins arm in each round.
Because r µ · x ≤ µ(x) for all x, each agent likes money more under µ than under r µ . Thus, we can couple the choices of agents between the two distributions: each agent who plays nonmyopically under the policy for D 1 can also be incentivized to do so under F using lower payments in expectation. Therefore, the optimal policy for the true distribution can only do better.
Formally, let arm i * be the Gittins arm at some round t during the execution of OPT 1 . Suppose that OPT 1 offers a payment of p on arm i * and the arm will be pulled with probability q when agents are drawn from D 1 s . When agents are drawn from F s instead, the probability q F that the arm will be pulled is no less than q as agents like money more under µ. Then our new policy for F s can randomize between offering the same payment p or offering no payment so that the overall probability of pulling i * under F s is the same as that under D 1 s . In this way, we can couple the execution of OPT 1 and our new policy so that agents always make a same choices yet OPT 1 offers more payment in expectation.
Upper bound: Next we show that in the worst case, the distribution (F s ) over concave functions does not yield a better approximation guarantee than (D 1 s ). First, notice that by the same argument as the previous paragraph, the principal's utility under (F s ) is upper bounded by her utility with the distribution (D 2 s ) s∈Σ over affine functions. We will upper-bound the worst-case utility under (D 2 s ) in terms of that under (D 1 s ). Thereto, we modify the Diamonds-in-the-rough instance from Section 4, by scaling all reward values by some large constant C. Let ξ = C(1 − γ)(1 − B) be the difference between the reward of the myopic arm and the Gittins arm. We will prove that for some carefully chosen constant C, the optimal policy with payments for D 2 cannot achieve much more than the optimum for D 1 . Let (c s ) s be the payments offered under different signals under the optimal solution for D 2 .
By the argument preceding the program (7), the optimum solution for D 2 maximizes (14) while the optimum solution for D 1 maximizes
Now, for any arbitrarily small ǫ, focus on a finite set Σ ′ of signals which together contribute at least a (1 − ǫ) fraction of the optimum utility under both D 1 and D 2 . Note that such a set must always exist, because we assumed that the signal space is countable; by sorting the signals by their contribution and taking prefixes in this ordering, we see that the total utility of these prefixes must converge to the overall total utility as the size of the prefix grows.
For each individual signal s, the optimal c s → ∞ as C → ∞. Thus, because Σ ′ is finite, for any desired lower bound α, there exists a C such that c s ≥ α for all s ∈ Σ ′ . Similarly, for any ǫ > 0, there is a (sufficiently large) β such that
Given a target ǫ, we first choose a suitable β, and then choose C to ensure that α ≫ β. Then, we get that for all s ∈ Σ ′ ,
Because we assumed that D 1 s is continuous for each s, we obtain that for each s, by choosing α ≫ β large enough (ensured by making C large enough), Prob r∼D 1
By choosing C as the maximum of the corresponding values, this inequality holds simultaneously for all s. In summary, we obtain that
Substituting this inequality into the objective value (14) shows that the objective values (14) and (15) differ by at most
The optimum value of the objective (15) grows at least linearly in C. The reason is that when C is scaled up by any constant ν, a feasible solution is obtained by scaling all c s up by ν as well; this results in a multiplicative increase of ν in the objective value. Thus, the best c s values must attain at least such an increase. Because the error term
Finally, adding in the O(ǫ) terms for signals not considered in this argument does not change the above conclusion. Making ǫ arbitrarily small (and scaling the Diamonds-in-the-Rough instance correspondingly) then shows in the limit that the distributions over linear and affine functions have the same worst-case behavior.
Garbling of Signaling Schemes
In this section, we show that if we garble a signaling scheme ϕ into ϕ ′ , the optimal approximation ratio for the garbled signaling scheme ϕ ′ cannot improve. By "garbling," we mean (stochastically) mapping each signal in ϕ to a random (new) signal in ϕ ′ . Marschak and Miyasawa [26] gave the following 14 formal definition (rephrased to fit our model):
Definition 25 Let ϕ, ϕ ′ be signaling schemes with respective signal spaces Σ, Σ ′ . Then, ϕ ′ is a garbling of ϕ if for all conversion ratios r and signals s ∈ Σ, s ′ ∈ Σ ′ : f s,s ′ (r) = f s (r), where f s (r) is the pdf of conversion ratio r conditioned on signal s.
As one can see, the garbled signaling scheme ϕ ′ contains less information than the original signaling scheme ϕ. Recall that 1− p * (ψ)γ gives the optimal approximation ratio when the underlying (exogenous) signaling scheme is ψ. Intuitively, more informative signaling schemes should give raise to better approximation ratios, i.e. 1 − p * (ϕ)γ ≥ 1 − p * (ϕ ′ )γ if ϕ ′ is garbled from ϕ. Theorem 3, restated here, confirms this intution.
Theorem 3 Let ϕ and ϕ ′ be two signaling schemes such that ϕ ′ is a garbling of ϕ. Then,
Proof. Let p s , p s ′ be the unconditional probabilities of observing signals s, s ′ , as defined in Section 2.3, and let (q s ′ ) s ′ ∈Σ ′ be the optimal solution for program (5) with signaling scheme ϕ ′ . We will show that the program (5) for signaling scheme ϕ has a feasible solution (q s ) s∈Σ such that
This implies that the policy with the garbled signaling scheme cannot outperform the policy with the original signaling scheme.
Let p s,s ′ be the (joint) probability that signal s is revealed by ϕ and signal s ′ is revealed by the garbling ϕ ′ . Thus, p s ′ = s∈Σ p s,s ′ . Conditioned on the two revealed signals s, s ′ , let q s,s ′ be the probability that the policy with parameters (q s ′ ) s ′ ∈Σ (which only observes s ′ ) obtains a myopic arm pull. Notice that this probability depends on s: while s does not affect the threshold that is set by the policy, it does affect the distribution of the agent's conversion ratio, and hence the probability of a myopic pull. Thus, the overall probability of a myopic pull with signal s ′ can be obtained by summing over all (unobserved) signals s as p s ′ q s ′ = s∈Σ p s,s ′ q s,s ′ .
Since q s ′ is a feasible solution of (5), we have
, we can write
.
Next, we observe that
s ′ (q s ′ ), as follows: because ϕ ′ is a garbling of ϕ, we get that the conditional distributions satisfy F s (r) = F s,s ′ (r). F −1 s ′ (q s ′ ) =: τ is a threshold chosen by the mechanism with knowledge solely of s ′ , chosen to achieve a probability of myopic play of exactly q s ′ . q s,s ′ denotes the probability of myopic play with this threshold τ , with the additional knowledge that the ungarbled signal was s. Thus, we obtain that q s,s ′ = F s,s ′ (τ ) = F s (τ ), by the garbling property. Taking inverses now shows that F −1 
Here, the inequality labeled (*) followed by semi-regularity of F s . The inequality derived above implies that q s is a feasible solution of (5) with signaling scheme ϕ, and it attains at least the same utility for the principal. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Conclusions
We showed that the framework recently proposed by Frazier et al. [9] can be generalized to the case when different agents have different and non-linear tradeoffs for money vs. utility derived from arm pulls. While the generalized framework does not result in as clean a characterization of feasible regions as the original work of Frazier et al. [9] , it nonetheless holds true that time-expanded versions of Gittins index policies are optimal in the worst case, and that worst-case examples are of the simple "Diamond-in-the-rough" form. We needed to assume a technical condition called semi-regularity for our results. Whether time-expanded policies are optimal in the absence of this condition is open.
There are many natural ways in which the model of Frazier et al. [9] coul dbe further generalized. Perhaps most intriguingly, in the model, agents only interact with the mechanism once, whereas it would be natural to assume that the same agents return multiple times. A natural model here would be one of the principal and just one agent, who has a different (steeper) time discount γ ′ < γ than the principal, and must be incentivized to pull arms with more foresight. In this sense, we analyzed the special case γ ′ = 0.
This direction appears quite a bit more difficult to analyze. If agents may return more than once, this opens the door for strategic behavior; it seems possible that an agent may choose a particular arm to pull to help or prevent the principal from learning, in turn affecting possible future payments. This makes this model quite a bit more complicated to analyze.
If one were to try and take the model into a direction of more realism, one could consider specifics of some of the applications listed in the introduction, such as that of an online retailer. In that case, one may have to account for the fact that agents who receive a payment (i.e., discount) on a product may alter their perception or rating of the product.
[31] George J. Stigler. Information in the labor market. 
A Missing Proofs
Lemma 7 Let G be the CDF of a non-negative random variable, and define G −1 (x) := sup{t ≥ 0 : G(t) ≤ x}. If G −1 (x)(1 − x) is concave, then
Proof. We only need to look at 3 points x, αx + (1 − α)y and y, where 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1. Let z = αx + (1 − α)y By concavity of G −1 (x) (1 − x) , we have
Rearranging, we have:
By monotonicity of G −1 , G −1 (x) ≤ G −1 (z) ≤ G −1 (y). This implies
as G −1 (x) ≤ G −1 (z) and G −1 (y) ≥ G −1 (z). One can see that inequality (18) is equivalent to the convexity of
The proofs are very straightforward (syntactic) modifications of those of the corresponding lemmas in [9] , we include them here for completeness.
Lemma 11 (Modification of Lemma 4.2 of [9] ) Given a parameter λ and a signaling scheme ϕ. Let ζ t−1 = t ′ <t Z t ′ be the total number of non-myopic steps performed by the time-expanded algorithm TES q,A,ϕ prior to time t, where q satisfies s∈Σ p s q s ≥ λ s∈Σ p s . Then, for any 0 ≤ n ≤ t,
Proof. The Lagrangian utility at time t is v t,it − λc t,it . Let x = max i E [v t,i | S t , Z 0:t−1 ] and y = E v t,i * t | S t , Z 0:t−1 , where Z 0:t−1 = (Z 0 , Z t , . . . , Z t−1 ). Since the myopic arm is played with probability q s , the expected Lagrangian utility will be Since the expected reward only depends on the current state of arm S t , we can add the status of previous round to the condition, E TES q,A,ϕ [v t,it − λc t,it | S 0:t , Z 0:t−1 ] ≥ E TES q,A,ϕ v t,i * t | S 0:t , Z 0:t−1 .
Taking conditional expectation on both sides with the conditionŜ t , ζ t−1 = n, E TES q,A,ϕ E TES q,A,ϕ [v t,it − λc t,it | S 0:t , Z 0:t−1 ] |Ŝ t , ζ t−1 = n ≥ E TES q,A,ϕ E TES q,A,ϕ v t,i * t | S 0:t , Z 0:t−1 |Ŝ t , ζ t−1 = n .
SinceŜ t , ζ t−1 = n is measurable by S 0:t , Z 0:t−1 , we can use the tower property of conditional expectations and get E TES q,A,ϕ v t,it − λc t,it |Ŝ t , ζ t−1 = n ≥ E TES q,A,ϕ v t,i * t |Ŝ t , ζ t−1 = n .
Let τ ≥ t be the next time when TES q,A,ϕ performs a non-myopic pull. Since the reward sequence for each arm forms a Martingale, and i * u is fixed with a certainŜ t , we have that E TES q,A,ϕ v u,i * u |Ŝ t , ζ t−1 = n is identical for all u ≥ t. Writing E TES q,A,ϕ v τ,i * τ |Ŝ t , ζ t−1 = n with the law of total probability, we have So far, we have proved that E TES q,A,ϕ v t,it − λc t,it |Ŝ t , ζ t−1 = n ≥ E TES q,A,ϕ v τ,i * τ |Ŝ t , ζ t−1 = n . 
In the penultimate step, we use
n+i n x i = (1 − x) −(n+1) for n ≥ 0 and |x| < 1.
B Impossibility of Exploration with Reward-Dependent Payments
In this section, we show that if the payment scheme is a function only of the arm reward obtained by the agent, it can be impossible to incentivize the agent to pull the optimal arm. We use a slightly modified "Diamonds in the Rough" instance ∆(B, γ), by changing the myopic arm to two arms. Both of them produce i.i.d. rewards from a known distribution. The distributions are showed in Table 1: Reward Arm 1 outputs reward with probability Arm 2 outputs reward with probability We emphasize that this is not the type of arm with degenerate distribution that produces an initially unknown constant reward.
Also we keep the infinite supply of arms with degenerate distribution. Recall the definition as follows, 1. With probability 1/M , the arm's reward is a degenerate distribution of the constant (1 − γ)B · M (good state);
